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 A Strawsonian Objection to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 
 
The gist of one of Strawson’s—by now, familiar—objections [3] to Russell’s 
theory of descriptions [2] is that a speaker may, quite naturally and correctly, utter 
a sentence of the form ‘the F is G’ to talk about, and be understood as talking 
about, a particular F even when it is commonly known that there is more than one 
F. Yet, the objection continues, by Russell’s theory (RTD) such an utterance 
would strictly speaking be false. 
 Modern Russellians—as is also well known—weather the attack by 
pointing out that the context in which an incomplete (definite) description is 
normally used will furnish either (a) an adequate ‘completion’ of the description 
or (b) an adequate delimitation of the domain of quantification. They come 
armed, moreover, with the Gricean distinction between expressed and intended 
propositions so that they can accommodate the intuition that utterances involving 
incomplete descriptions often convey object-dependent propositions. Since 
Strawson himself takes contextual features to aid the singling-out of objects when 
descriptions are used (see e.g. [3], pp. 21-22; [4], pp. 186-87), it would appear 
that these Russellian moves lead more or less to a stand off (see Neale [1] for a 
recent discussion). 
 Not quite. Strawson sought to displace RTD by bringing to our 
consideration normal, but (allegedly) RTD-countervailing, uses of descriptions. 
Russellians have generally responded, not by challenging Strawson’s estimation 
of the (kinds of) circumstances in which descriptions are normally used, i.e. his 
appraisal of what counts as a ‘normal’ use, but by attempting to show that such 
uses actually square with a plausibly-embellished version of RTD. This leaves us 
with an alternative line of attack: that of furnishing abnormal uses of 
descriptions, i.e. uses which ordinary speakers of the language would consider 
‘unnatural’ or ‘improper’, but which in fact comply with RTD (embellished or 
not). 
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 Let us begin by considering a (hypothetical) use of an incomplete 
description, ‘the F’, where the speaker does not have a particular F in mind, and 
where, to boot, the context does not suggest an adequate completion of the 
description or a sufficiently restrictive delimitation of the domain of 
quantification. Suppose that someone uttered 
 
 (1) The table is covered with books. 
 
in a room containing numerous tables, many covered with books and many not, 
but with no specific table (or any other object, for that matter) in mind. In my 
opinion, we would find that utterance, call it ‘t’, unintelligible—in the sense that 
we would feel unable to specify what it would take, what the world would have 
to be like, for that utterance to be true.1 Of course, we might ask the speaker 
which table she was talking about; but after the response to the effect that she 
wasn’t talking about any particular table, as the supposition demands, we surely 
would be at a loss as to how to take (interpret) t. However, if RTD were correct, t 
should be intelligible even though it is not ‘contextually-complete’. For, 
intuitively, an utterance in the same context of the Russellian paraphrase of (1), 
viz. 
 
 (1a) There is exactly one table and whatever is a table is covered with 
books. 
 
would be intelligible, albeit manifestly false. The problem this poses for 
Russellians is clear. On their account these utterances would have the same 
                                                 
    1In denying that t is intelligible, I am not denying that the sentence-type of which it is 
a token, viz. (1), is meaningful in the sense Strawson takes sentences to be meaningful 
or significant ([6], pp. 9-10). For Strawson, a sentence’s meaningfulness (significance) 
consists in its potential for being used to make true or false statements; clearly, (1) has 
this potential too. 
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content; but how, in that case, can the difference in intelligibility be explained? It 
seems that we do have a clash between RTD and ordinary language, as Strawson 
suggests. 
 The likes of t thereby give rise to a stronger Strawsonian argument against 
RTD (as an account of natural-language descriptions). In its general form, it runs 
something like this. Utterances involving contextually-incomplete descriptions 
are unintelligible in that we have grave difficulty in ascertaining what is asserted 
in such cases. We would face no such difficulty if RTD were correct, however, 
for the quantificational paraphrases of these utterances validated by RTD aren’t 
unintelligible in this sense. Hence, the Russellian account is not correct. 
 It would be a mistake to see this objection as merely a variation of 
Strawson’s point about the disparity between the verdict of ordinary language and 
RTD on a present-day utterance, k, of 
 
 (2) The king of France is wise. 
 
According to Strawson, we—that is, ordinary speakers—would be disinclined to 
proclaim the utterance either as true or as false, and, indeed, it does follow from 
what I say that we would be similarly disinclined in the case of t. But, there is a 
significant point of disanalogy: our discomfort with t stems from our inability to 
interpret it, i.e. to determine its truth-conditions, whereas we have no such 
difficulty in the case of k. In contrast to t, we do know (or think we know) what it 
would take for k to be true or false—France would have to have a (unique) king 
who was (or was not) wise. The newer objection therefore cuts deeper in my 
opinion. 
 Some readers may find the objection unconvincing precisely because the 
alleged counterexamples to RTD involve ‘abnormal’ uses of descriptions (and, 
consequently, ‘abnormal’ speakers of the language). The following thought does 
seem compelling: that if a theory of content is to be challenged by way of 
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exposing a clash with ordinary language, one needs to provide normal, i.e. 
natural, examples; after all, the reasoning runs, no theory could be expected to 
account for abnormal uses—these simply resist any standard analysis. This 
response misses the point however, or, rather, ‘mislocates’ the clash. The utterer 
of t, for instance, is indeed an ‘abnormal’ speaker—in that she is using a 
description abnormally by our, that is ordinary speakers’, lights. But, this is 
precisely what presents the problem for Russellians: as already noted, they owe 
an explanation of why it is that someone who uttered (1) in the envisaged 
circumstances would be regarded as ‘abnormal’, as having misused language, 
whereas someone who uttered (1a) would not be so regarded. 
 In any case, the objection can be made without recourse to deviant uses or 
speakers. Suppose that in the envisaged (‘many-table’) scenario we were asked to 
assess the correctness of certain sentences, among them (1) and (1a), which were 
generated by a computer and displayed on a screen (say). I venture that even in 
that situation we would be inclined to proclaim the token of (1a) as false but 
would experience as much difficulty in simply interpreting the token of (1), i.e. in 
determining its truth-conditions, as in the earlier example. So, we would have the 
same problem, but no actual deviant uses or users.2 
 Another thought which might fuel reservations about the force of the 
objection is the thought that Russellians already have a perfectly adequate 
explanation of t’s unintelligibility. Surely, it may be reasoned, the fact that it is 
manifestly false is quite sufficient to account for the difficulty we experience in 
interpreting t; it is only natural that we are highly reluctant to take the utterer as 
saying something which she clearly knows to be false. However, if this 
explanation were right, we would have no more difficulty in interpreting t than 
we would an utterance, in the same context, of the manifestly false (1a). But, 
intuitively, this just is not so. 
                                                 
    2I thank Peter Millican for suggesting something along these lines. 
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 In any case, the objection can in fact be made with examples involving 
utterances which would be true by RTD. Consider the many-table scenario again. 
Suppose someone in that situation uttered 
 
 (3) It’s not the case that the table is covered with books.3 
 
I take it Russellians would assume, or regard as quite legitimate, that the domain 
of quantification includes the furniture in the room. In that case, the utterance 
should be heard as true, since the Russellian paraphrase: 
 
 (3a) It’s not the case that there is exactly one table and that whatever is 
a table is covered with books. 
 
is manifestly true with respect to that domain of quantification. But, intuitively, 
the utterance of (3) would be just as impenetrable as t. So, we can argue as 
follows. An utterance of (3) in the envisaged scenario would not appear 
inappropriate (improper) if the Russellian account were correct, whereas our 
intuition is that it most certainly would do. (Hence, ... etc.) 
 What moral should we draw from these clashes between RTD and our 
linguistic intuitions? The problematic utterances of (1) and (3) have the following 
feature in common: the utterer (in each case) evidently has no intention of 
referring, that is, of saying something about a particular object. I suggest it is 
precisely because of this absence of ‘referential-intent’ that the user (or use) is 
regarded as deviant or the utterance as unintelligible. If my diagnosis is right, the 
moral of our considerations would appear to be that definite descriptions really 
are devices for referring to objects rather than quantifying over them; Russell’s 
                                                 
    3I consider (3) instead of: The table is not covered with books precisely so as to 
preclude the primary-occurrence reading of the ‘the table’ (see [4], p. 53). 
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quantificational treatment of them, however it is embellished, is, in that case, 
fundamentally mistaken.4 
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    4The main argument was presented to seminars at the Universities of Leeds and 
Cambridge. I thank the participants of those meetings for fruitful discussions. I also 
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